Collateralisation of borrowing may reduce bank resolution costs

IMF headquarters in Washington, DC

Depositor preference and collateralisation of borrowing may reduce the cost of settling the conflicts among creditors that arises in case of resolution or bankruptcy, according to a recent IMF working paper.

Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance, by Daniel Hardy, argues that this net benefit, which may be capitalised into the value of the bank rather than affect creditors' expected returns, should result in lower overall funding costs and thus a lower probability of

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