Opacity of a credible central bank and inflation

The Discussion Paper "Can opacity of a credible central bank explain excessive inflation?" from the University of Munich shows that, even in the absence of inflationary bias, a credible central bank may find it optimal to implement an accommodating monetary policy in response to cost-push shocks whenever the uncertainty surrounding its monetary instrument is high.

Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank's credibility. In this context, most of the literature considers

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