Brookings paper examines impact of governance structures on use of CCyBs
Countries with strong governance mechanisms are more likely to use the macro-prudential tool, researchers find
Countries with financial stability committees with strong governance mechanisms are more likely to implement countercyclical capital buffers (CCyBs) than those with weaker governance, a paper published by the Brookings Institution finds.
Using data from 58 countries, Rochelle Edge and Nellie Lang examine whether new governance structures for managing macro-prudential policy, including “multi-agency financial stability committees” (FSCs), affect decisions to implement CCyBs.
They find that
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