Central banks more independent in decentralised states: BIS

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A Bank for International Settlements paper published on Friday examines the autonomy of central banks over history and its implications for monetary policy.

Harold James, the paper's author, says the central bank autonomy is desired as a result of the demand for price stability and that in general, central banks are likely to be more independent in decentralised federal states than in centralised unitary states

James also notes that economic and financial crises can change the political

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