The myth of independence
US Federal Reserve stresses independence from government as central to ability to fulfil its dual mandate, but approach is fundamentally flawed
The claim that independent or depoliticised central banks generate better price-stability outcomes than less independent central banks has now achieved the status of conventional wisdom.1 This conventional wisdom is widely accepted, and has influenced the institutional redesign of existing central banks, granting greater de jure, or legal, independence from government (for example, the Bank of England in 1997, the Bank of Japan in 1998 and the Bank of Korea in 1998). It has also influenced the
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