Governors rarely removed by central bank boards
Ultimate responsibility broadly vested in heads of state, other government entities
Central bank governors in the majority of institutions can be removed before their tenure expires, but such decisions are rarely taken by boards, the Governance Benchmarks 2024 finds.
Just two (5%) of 40 respondents say the central bank board has the ultimate authority to dismiss a governor in office. The result is largely consistent with the 2023 benchmarks outcome, where just one institution said the board had this power.
The power to remove a governor lies mainly with the head of state
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